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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Allen Gillespie asserts that the district court abused its discretion when
relinquished jurisdiction, or alternatively, when it failed to reduce his sentence sua
sponte pursuant to I.C.R. 35 (hereinafter, Rule 35). He contends that the district court
insufficiently considered the mitigating factors in his case when it made the decision to
revoke.

As a result, he requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems

appropriate.

Alternatively, he requests that this Court vacate the order revoking

probation and remand for a new hearing.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
Mr. Gillespie entered a binding I.C.R. 11 plea agreement with the State, agreeing
to plead guilty to driving under the influence (hereinafter, DUI).

(R., pp.18-20.)

In

exchange, he would be sentenced to a unified sentence of seven years, with three
years fixed, and jurisdiction would be retained.

(R., p.19.)

The district court would

specifically recommend the CAPP rider program. 1 (R., p.19.) Mr. Gillespie also agreed
to waive "his appeal and Rule 35 relief."
arraignment.

(Tr., Vol. 1, p.1, Ls.4-12l

(R., p.19.)

He offered that plea at his

The district court accepted the I.C.R. 11

agreement. 3 (Tr., Vo1.2, p.11, L.22 - p.12, L.5, p.14, Ls.14-17; see also R., pp.46-47.)

1 The CAPP program is specifically designed to present intensive treatment focused
on substance abuse issues.
Idaho Dep't of Correction, "Correctional Alternative
Placement Program (CAPP)," http://www.idoc.idaho.gov/contentllocations/prisons/
correctional_alternative_placement_program.
2 The transcripts in this case are contained in two independently-paginated volumes.
To avoid confusion, the volume containing the arraignment hearing held on March 25,
2011, will be referred to as "VoI.1." The volume containing the sentencing hearing held
on June 6,2011, will be referred to as "VoI.2."
3 The Presentence Investigation Report (hereinafter, PSI) noted Mr. Gillespie's desire to
accept responsibility for his actions as well as the impact his mental conditions

1

His sentence was ordered to be concurrent to the sentences arising from three, related
misdemeanors, to which Mr. Gillespie had also pled guilty. (Tr., p.16, L.18 - p.17, L.13;
R, pp.5-10.)
Rather than place Mr. Gillespie in the CAPP program, the Department of
Correction placed him in the Therapeutic Community rider program because he did not
meet the Department's educational requirements for the CAPP program at that time. 4
As placement in the CAPP program had been a major component of the I.C.R. 11
agreement, Mr. Gillespie filed a Rule 35 motion requesting the district court place him
on probation as a result of the Department of Correction's decision to place him in the
TC rider program.

(R., pp.53-58.) The district court denied the motion because the

decision to send Mr. Gillespie to the TC program was not unreasonable and the
agreement did not bind the Department of Correction. 5 (R., pp.81-82.)
Nevertheless, Mr. Gillespie was able to be somewhat successful during his
period of retained jurisdiction. He did not receive any formal disciplinary reports, and

(depression and dyslexia) have had. (PSI, pp.18-19.) It also noted that Mr. Gillespie
had been sexually abused by his stepfather, an incident which had gone unaddressed
in his life. (PSI, p.14.) As a result, he presents in the moderate range of victimization.
(GAIN-I Recommendation and Referral Summary (hereinafter, GRRS), p.12.) He also
has employable skills as a heating and cooling technician. (PSI, p.16.) Ultimately, the
presentence investigator recommended that Mr. Gillespie participate in the CAPP
program during a period of retained jurisdiction. (PSI, p.19.)
4 The therapeutic community, or TC, rider program focuses on helping participants
develop community relationships by focusing on building a "pro-social lifestyle." Idaho
Dep't of Correction, "Programming," http://www.idoc.idaho.gov/contentlprisons/cl/
sbwcc/programming. The TC program is designed to reshape behaviors, attitudes and
values, helping to resocialize the participant in preparation for release on probation. As
part of that process, participants are required to attend a substance-abuse-specific
program. Idaho Dep't of Correction Standard Operating Procedure 607.26.01.011,
Version
2.7,
pp.3-4,
available
at
http://www.idoc.idaho.gov/content/policy/
therapeutic_community.
5 Neither the State nor the district court argued for denial based on the waiver of Rule
35 relief in the agreement. (See generally R., pp.65-66, 81-82.)
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the only informal report was for exceeding the permitted number of telephone calls
during one week.

(Addendum to PSI (hereinafter APSI), p.2; C-Notes (attached to

ASPI), p.1.) The APSI noted that, while he was disconcerted with his placement in the
TC, as oppose to the CAPP, program, he was able to recognize some of the factors
contributing to his behavior and began to work toward correcting them. (See APSI, p.2
("He

can

admit that

his

need

for

instant gratification

has created

negative

consequences .... He seems to continue to struggle with taking responsibility for his
criminal thinking and behavior. At times he has been able to show that he can follow
the rules .... ").) For example, in regard to his rehabilitation in the relapse prevention
group, "Mr. Gillespie is both up and down, insightful and in denial, and receives and
struggles with feedback in RPG. At times, he is open to feedback, willing to participate,
and can articulate insights."

(Footprints Therapeutic Community Discharge Summary

(hereinafter, Discharge Summary) (attached to APSI), p.2.) He also would have
adequate support from his family. (APSI, p.3.) He had two verified places he could live
on release, one with his brother, the other with his mother. (C-Notes, p.2.) However,
he was not able to complete all his assigned programs. (APSI, p.1.) Because of his
incomplete rehabilitation, the report recommended that the district court relinquish
jurisdiction. (APSI Recommendation Notice.)
The district court accepted that recommendation without a hearing and
relinquished jurisdiction. (R., pp.86-87.) Thereafter, Mr. Gillespie moved for the district
court to reconsider its decision.

(R., p.88.)

3

The district court decided that this

information was unpersuasive and denied Mr. Gillespie's motion. 6

(R., pp.106-07.)

Mr. Gillespie timely appealed from that order. (R., pp.1 08-12.)

Because this constitutes a second or successive Rule 35 motion, that decision is not
challenged on appeal. See, e.g., State v. Atwood, 122 Idaho 199, 200-01 (Ct. App.
1992); State v. Wers/and, 125 Idaho 499,504-05 (1994); State v. Hurst, 151 Idaho 430,
439 (Ct. App. 2011).
6

4

ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion by relinquishing jurisdiction over
Mr. Gillespie, or alternatively, by not reducing his sentence sua sponte pursuant to Rule
35 when it did so.

5

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Relinquishing Jurisdiction Over
Mr. Gillespie, Or Alternatively, By Not Reducing His Sentence Sua Sponte
Pursuant To Rule 35 When It Did So

A

Introduction
Mr. Gillespie asserts that, when the district court relinquished jurisdiction in his

case, it failed to sufficiently consider all the factors at play in his rehabilitative process,
particularly those which demonstrated that he was beginning to make progress in that
process and those which showed that he was in a position to continue making progress
if released on probation. However, the district court decided to forego that opportunity
because Mr. Gillespie had not been perfect in his first rehabilitative opportunity. That
constitutes an abuse of discretion, and this Court should provide the appropriate
remedy.

B.

The Waiver Of Appellate Relief Included In The I.C.R. 11 Plea Agreement Does
Not Extend To An Appeal From The Decision To Relinquish Jurisdiction
As a threshold matter, this Court must determine whether Mr. Gillespie's claim is

justiciable.

His plea agreement contained the following language:

"The Defendant

waives appeal and Idaho Criminal Rule 35 relief." (R., p.19.) However, Mr. Gillespie
contends that this waiver does not bar the present appeal.
While appellate waivers are permissible, "I.C.R. 11 (d)(1 ),7 [is] a rule adopted by
this Court which specifically contemplates plea agreements in which the defendant
waives his right to appeal the judgment and sentence of the court." State v. Murphy,
125 Idaho 456, 457 (1994) (emphasis added). Entry of judgment and sentencing can

7 I.C.R. 11 was amended in 2007. See I.C.R. 11. Currently, section (f)(1) discusses the
ability of the defendant to waive his appellate rights pursuant to a plea agreement.
I.C.R.11(f)(1)
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only occur once, at the sentencing hearing. State v. Coassolo, 136 Idaho 138, 142-43
(2001). It cannot occur after a period of jurisdiction has been served by the defendant.
Id. Therefore, the defendant's opportunity to appeal the judgment and sentence of the
court arises only from the original judgment of conviction and a waiver of those rights
does not extend to a subsequent ruling to relinquish jurisdiction.
This is true even though the default rule for periods of retained jurisdiction is that,
without an affirmative decision to place the defendant on probation, he will remain
incarcerated. See, e.g., State v. Peterson, 149 Idaho 808,812 (Ct. App. 2010). That is
because the order relinquishing jurisdiction is not coextensive with the judgment of
conviction. For example, a period of retained jurisdiction enlarges the filing period for
"an appeal from the sentence contained in the criminal judgment," but does not extend
the filing period in regard to any other appeal challenging other aspects of the judgment.
I.AR. 14(a) (emphasis added). Ultimately, when a defendant seeks relief from an order
relinquishing jurisdiction (i.e., "reconsideration" of that order), "[r)elief from such an order
more appropriately should be sought through a direct appeal." State v. Roberts, 126
Idaho 920, 922 (1995) (emphasis added); I.AR. 11 (C)(9).8

As such, pursuant to

I.AR. 11 (c)(9), Mr. Gillespie may appeal a decision to relinquish jurisdiction of right.
Roberts, 126 Idaho at 922. His waiver only extended to the judgment of conviction and
the sentence contained therein. Murphy, 125 Idaho at 457; I.AR. 14(a). Therefore, he
retained the right to challenge the decision to relinquish jurisdiction itself, a right which
he now exercises on direct appeal.

8 I.AR. 11 addresses which orders which are appealable as a matter of right and should
not be confused with I.C.R. 11, which addresses guilty pleas.

7

Even if this Court finds that precedent to be unpersuasive, it should still permit
this appeal to proceed because the waiver clause is ambiguous. The waiver clause
states only that "[t]he Defendant waives appeal and Idaho Criminal Rule 35 relief." (R,
p.19.)

This clause is ambiguous, as it is unspecific as to the scope of that waiver,

particularly as to whether it extends to every potential future ruling in this case (for
example, whether to relinquish jurisdiction, or whether to grant relief pursuant to I.C. §
19-2604).9 Every other provision of the agreement is specific. (See, e.g., R, p.18-20.)
For example, the sentencing provision of the agreement provides as follows:
2. The Defendant shall be sentenced to 36 months fixed and 48 months
indeterminate, with credit for time served and the court to retain
Jurisdiction and recommend placement in the CAPP program during the
retained jurisdiction. If the Defendant successfully completes the retained
jurisdiction, the court shall suspend the execution of the sentence and
place the defendant on supervised probation for a period of four (4) years.
The Defendant's driver's license shall be suspended for five (5) years with
absolutely no driving privileges.
(R, p.19.)

That provision is detailed in the extreme and leaves no room for debate

about how long Mr. Gillespie was to be sentenced, how long his period of probation was
to be, how long his license would be suspended, and to which rider program he should
have been sent. 1O (See R, p.19.)

Contrarily, the waiver clause is nowhere near as

specific, ambiguously leaving open questions about whether Mr. Gillespie could pursue

9 I.C. § 19-2604 empowers the district court to afford various forms of relief, such as
reduction, or even dismissal, of charges following successful participation in a drug
court program, a period of retained jurisdiction, or a period of probation. I.C. § 19-2604.
Given that Mr. Gillespie was bargaining specifically for participation in the CAPP rider
program (see R, p.53), it is axiomatic that he would want to retain the ability to
challenge a future denial of a motion in that regard.
10 The agreement could have simply provided that the district court would retain
jurisdiction, but instead, it specifically identified the CAPP program as the rider program
contemplated and anticipated as a result of the agreement. (See R, p.53 (arguing the
same point).)
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future relief (or appeals from denials thereof), particularly if facts unknown at the time of
the plea agreement were to come to light or certain situations arise. (See R., p.19.)
Plea agreements are like contracts, and thus, are analyzed pursuant to contract
law standards. State v. Doe, 138 Idaho 409, 410-11 (Ct. App. 2003). Ambiguities in
plea agreements are to be resolved in favor of the defendant. 11 State v. Peterson, 148
Idaho 593, 595 (2010); see also Hughey v. United States, 495 U.S. 411, 422 (1990)
(declaring that the rule of lenity requires ambiguous agreements to be resolved in favor
of the defendant, regardless of policy and legislative history). This is because the focus
of a plea agreement is "'on the defendant's reasonable understanding [which] also
reflects the proper constitutional focus on what induced the defendant to plead guilty.'"

State v. Nienburg, _

P.3d

Docket Number 38656, p.4 (Ct. App. 2012) (quoting

Peterson, 148 Idaho at 596 (in turn quoting United States v. De la Fuente, 8 F.3d 1333,
1337 n.7)) (emphasis from Nienburg), reh'g denied.

As such, the ambiguous waiver

clause should be construed in Mr. Gillespie's favor.

As discussed supra, there are

several scenarios, such as the potential for relief pursuant to I.C. § 19-2604, which
could have unfolded and in which Mr. Gillespie, by the very bargain he struck, would
likely not have desired to waive appellate options. See Nienburg, Docket Number
38656, p.4.

Therefore, the waiver would not extend to appeals from decisions other

than the original imposition of sentence and judgment of conviction.

C.

The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Revoking Mr. Gillespie's Probation
Without Sufficiently Considering the Mitigating Factors In The Record

11 Notably, in this case, the State drafted the I.C.R. 11 agreement. (R., p.18 ("COME
NOW, The Plaintiff, State of Idaho ... ").) Therefore, even putting aside the rule of lenity
and assessing the agreement under general contract principles, ambiguities in this
agreement would be construed against the State as the drafting party. See, e.g.,
Haener v. Ada County Highway Dist., 108 Idaho 170, 173 (1985); Freeman & Co. v.
Bolt, 132 Idaho 152, 156 (Ct. App. 1998).
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Mr. Gillespie asserts that, given any view of the facts, the decision to revoke
probation and execute his unified sentences of seven years, with three years fixed, was
an abuse of the district court's discretion. The decision to revoke probation is one within
the district court's discretion.

State v. Chavez, 134 Idaho 308, 312 (Ct. App. 2000).

The district court must determine "whether the probation is achieving the goal of
rehabilitation and whether continuation of the probation is consistent with the protection
of society."

Id.

The Legislature has established the criteria for determining whether

probation or incarceration is merited. State v. Merwin, 131 Idaho 642, 648 (1998) (citing
I.C. § 19-2521). In reviewing such a decision, the Court of Appeals uses a multi-tiered
inquiry, determining "(1) whether the lower court correctly perceived the issue as one of
discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the boundaries of such discretion
and consistent with any legal standards applicable to the specific choice before it; and
(3) whether the lower court reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Chavez, 134
Idaho at 312-13 (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600 (1989)). Accordingly, in
order to show an abuse of discretion, Mr. Gillespie must show that, in light of the
governing criteria, the sentence was excessive considering any view of the facts. See

id. at 312.
The governing criteria, or sentencing objectives, are:

(1) protection of society;

(2) deterrence of the individual and the public generally; (3) the possibility of
rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for wrongdoing. Id. The protection of
society is the primary objective the court should consider.
Idaho 497, 500 (1993).

State v. Charboneau, 124

Therefore, a sentence that protects society and also

accomplishes the other objectives will be considered reasonable. Id.; State v. To oh ill,
103 Idaho 565, 568 (Ct. App. 1982).

This is because the protection of society is
10

influenced by each of the other objectives, and as a result, each must be addressed in
sentencing. Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500.
There are several factors that a court should consider to determine whether
protection of society and rehabilitation (along with deterrence and retribution) are served
by a particular disposition. See State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 320 (2006). They
include, but are not limited to: "the defendant's good character, status as a first-time
offender, sincere expressions of remorse and amenability to treatment, and support of
family." Id.

Insufficient consideration of these factors has been the basis for a more

lenient sentence in several cases. See, e.g., Cook v. State, 145 Idaho 482,489-90 (Ct.
App. 2008); State v. Alberts, 121 Idaho 204, 209 (Ct. App. 1991); State v. Carrasco, 114
Idaho 348, 354-55 (Ct. App. 1988), rev'd on other grounds, 117 Idaho 295, 301 (1990);
State v. Shideler, 103 Idaho 593, 595 (1982). In this case, several of those factors are

present, but were insufficiently considered by the district court as it crafted its
disposition in regard to Mr. Gillespie. As a result, it did not sufficiently consider whether
Mr. Gillespie's probation was adequately serving the goal of rehabilitation or whether
society required protection from Mr. Gillespie through incarceration. See Chavez, 134
Idaho at 312. Therefore, this disposition constitutes an abuse of discretion.
The first factor requiring sufficient consideration was the underlying issue of
Mr. Gillespie's abusive childhood. See, e.g., State v. Wifliamson, 135 Idaho 618, 620
(Ct. App. 2001) (considering the defendant's abusive childhood, which served as a
precursor to the abuse of various narcotic substances and the impact that played on the
offense).

The PSI reported that Mr. Gillespie, along with his brothers, had been

sexually abused by one of his step-fathers. (PSI, p.14.) This event continues to impact
Mr. Gillespie, as he scores in the moderate range of victimization. (GRRS, p.12.) He
11

did not seek, nor was he provided, with counseling or treatment to address the effects of
this abuse. (See PSI, p.14.) He would also likely benefit from counseling in this regard,
as it may be an underlying cause of his depression. (See PSI, p.1?) Therefore, as in

Williamson, that traumatic past needed to be sufficiently considered in regard to its
impact on his current struggles with alcohol. See Williamson, 135 Idaho at 620.
Additionally, the district court needed to sufficiently consider Mr. Gillespie's
mental condition. Idaho Code § 19-2523 not only suggests, but requires, the trial court
to consider a defendant's mental illness or condition as a sentencing factor. See Hollon
v. State, 132 Idaho 573, 581 (1999). Mr. Gillespie has been diagnosed with depression,
which continues to affect him. (PSI, pp.16-17.) In addition, he has been diagnosed with
dyslexia. (PSI, p.16.) This condition led to his placement in a special education class
beginning in second grade. (PSI, p.16.) And while he was able to complete classes
through ninth grade, he still has a low reading level. (PSI, p.16.) This is important since
it means that his efforts to complete rehabilitative programs might be slower than
otherwise expected. It does not mean that he is unable to rehabilitate, just that it might
take longer, which is another reason not to forego such opportunities because he was
not perfect during his period of retained jurisdiction.

Without sufficiently considering

such factors, the district court's decision to relinquish jurisdiction cannot be a
reasonable exercise of its discretion. See Hollon, 132 Idaho at 581; Cook, 145 Idaho
at 490.
Furthermore, the district court needed to consider the efforts Mr. Gillespie made
during his period of retained jurisdiction. As there were deeply embedded issues, such

12

as the sexual abuse issue, his struggles to fully rehabilitate are not remarkable. 12
Nonetheless, he was beginning to make progress in his rehabilitative efforts. (See, e.g.,
PSI, pp.2-3; Discharge Summary, 2; R., pp.93-95.) Just because those efforts were not
perfect is not a sufficient reason to abandon rehabilitative alternatives. See Cook, 145
Idaho at 489 (recognizing that sentences are to be crafted so that they do not force the
prison to continue detaining a person if age or rehabilitation can or does reduce the risk
of recidivism); State v. Eubank, 114 Idaho 635, 639 (Ct. App. 1988) (same). Cook and

Eubank reveal that providing rehabilitative alternatives may provide more protection for
society in the long term. Furthermore, the timing of that rehabilitation is an important
consideration when addressing rehabilitation.

See State v. Owen, 73 Idaho 394, 402

(1953), overruled on other grounds by State v. Shepherd, 94 Idaho 227, 228 (1971);
State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 91 (1982); Cook, 145 Idaho at 489; Eubank, 114 Idaho at
639.

In this case, the decision to relinquish jurisdiction cut off a timely rehabilitation

process. That process should have been given more time, not cut short, as doing so
decreased the overall protection the sentence affords society, and thus, the decision
fails to promote two of the recognized sentencing objective, including the paramount
goal of protecting society. See Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500.
Evidencing Mr. Gillespie's rehabilitative progress and ongoing rehabilitative
potential, he accepted responsibility from the beginning. For example, he pled guilty at
his arraignment hearing.

(Tr., Vol. 1, p.1, LsA-12.) He accepted responsibility for his

actions and also offered his sincere apologies to the officers he had resisted and
assaulted. (See R., pp.7-10; PSI, pp.3, 18.) Acknowledgment of guilt and acceptance

Mr. Gillespie was only about three years old when the abuse began. (PSI, p.14.) He
was thirty-seven when he was sentenced. (PSI, p.1.)
12

13

of responsibility by the defendant are critical first steps toward rehabilitation. See State

v Kellis, 148 Idaho 812,815 (Ct App. 2010). By making these two acknowledgements,
Mr. Gillespie demonstrated that he has taken these critical first steps.
Finally, he presented sUbstantial evidence of the support offered by his family
and community.

(See, e.g., R., pp.93-105.) Such a support network is an important

commodity which helps the rehabilitation process, and which, if present, needs to be
sufficiently considered in regard to the decision to forego probation.

See Kellis, 148

Idaho at 817 (holding that familial support offered to affirm the defendant's innocence
does not equate to familial support offered in consideration of rehabilitation, implying
that had the support been offered for rehabilitation, it would be a mitigating factor worthy
of consideration). In particular, Mr. Gillespie has ongoing familial support, as both his
brother and his mother are willing and able to provide him with a place to live.
(C-Notes. p.2.)

He reported that the people he socialized with regularly were all

gainfully employed or attending school full time, and that none were involved in illegal
activity.

(GRRS, p.11.) That continuing community support needed to be sufficiently

considered by the district court. See Kef/is, 148 Idaho at 817.
A sufficient examination of all these factors reveals that such a sentence, one
which considers rehabilitation, still addresses all the other objectives - protection of
society, punishment, and deterrence. See State v. Ransom, 124 Idaho 703, 713 (1993)
(requiring that alternative sentences still address all the sentencing objectives). When a
sentencing court suspends a sentence and orders probation, it still imposes a sentence.
Therefore, both the retributive and the deterrent effects of the imposed sentence are still
present. See State v. Crockett, 146 Idaho 13, 14-15 (Ct. App. 2008) (discussing how a
sentence for a period of probation addresses all the sentencing objectives and how the
14

court's continuing jurisdiction affects those objectives).

In addition to restricting his

liberty at the discretion of the Board of Corrections and the looming sentence, he is also
deprived of several of his rights (such as the right to possess a firearm), since this is a
felony offense, Furthermore, the district court retains the ability to revoke the probation
and execute the original sentence if Mr. Gillespie were to fail to adhere to the terms of
his probation.

However, it could do so knowing that all the sentencing objectives

properly addressed. What the probationary period provides that a term sentence does
not is the opportunity to rehabilitate in a real-world setting, allowing him to apply the
lessons he would gain in out-patient treatment in a practical setting.
As such, given a sufficient consideration of all the factors, the district court's
decision to relinquish jurisdiction is revealed to be an abuse of its discretion. Therefore,
this Court should provide Mr, Gillespie with an appropriate remedy, and either reduce
his sentence as it deems appropriate or remand for a new determination by the district
court.

D.

Alternatively, The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Not Reducing
Mr. Gillespie's Sentences Sua Sponte Pursuant To Rule 35 When It Revoked His
Probation
Even if the district court did not abuse its discretion by revoking Mr. Gillespie's

probation, it did abuse its discretion by not further reducing his sentence sua sponte
pursuant to Rule 35 when it did so.

When the district court decides to resume the

execution of a previously-suspended sentence, as it does when it revokes probation, it
also has the authority to reduce the sentence, sua sponte, pursuant to Rule 35. State
V.

Timbana, 145 Idaho 779, 782 (2008)
The decision to not reduce a sentence that was pronounced, but suspended, will

be reversed on appeal if it constitutes an abuse of the district court's discretion.
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Hanington, 148 Idaho at 27. The standard of review and factors considered in such a

decision are the same as those used for the initial sentencing. Id. (citing among others,

To oh ill, 103 Idaho at 568). Therefore, the district court needed to sufficiently consider
the recognized sentencing objectives in light of the mitigating factors in the record.
See id.; Charboneau, 124 Idaho at 500.

A failure to do so should result in a more

lenient sentence. See, e.g., Cook, 145 Idaho at 489-90; Shideler, 103 Idaho at 595.
Therefore, for all the reasons discussed in Section (B), supra, the district court
abused its discretion by not reducing Mr. Gillespie's sentence sua sponte, even if only in
recognition of his successful efforts on probation to that point.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Gillespie respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it
deems appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district
court for a new sentencing hearing.
DATED this 20 th day of August, 2012.

BRIAN R DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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